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Introduction
Economic activities are considered informal because they operate outside the law and account for a significant part of income and employment in most developing countries. The informal sector enables people from all walks of life to obtain power and control over their own means of subsistence (Muller, 2005; Muller and Posel, 2004) and to flexibly explore their talents, skills and opportunities by starting the entrepreneurial journey at a very basic level. However, these activities are unrecorded, legally unrecognised and unprotected (Williams and Nadin, 2010) . Most operators grapple with hostility, unpredictability and lack of property rights [1] . They face poor access to workspace and basic services and are characterised by low levels of productivity, incomes, growth and poor quality of jobs (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; Kistruck et al., 2015) . Informal firms do not directly pay taxes and may present unfair competition to the formal ones (Abdallah, 2017; Farrell, 2004; Levy, 2008) . Informality thwarts poverty reduction by trapping the poor in a vicious cycle of low awareness and capacity -lack of legal protection and access to basic services -and low productivity and income (Hudson et al., 2012; Wangwe and Mmari, 2014) .
Formalisation attempts have, however, had very limited success. Some scholars have questioned the argument that informality tends to decline proportionately with GDP growth or economic transformation, citing Indonesia and South Africa as examples. For instance, despite substantial growth and the transformation of Indonesia from an agrarian to an industrialised, medium income economy, over 90 per cent of its enterprises are informal (Rothenberg et al., 2016) , while South Africa's first-world economy co-exists with a large informal economy. In fact, it is estimated that 83 per cent of the micro, small and medium enterprises in South Africa are informal (Finscope, 2011) .
The main approach used to realise formalisation is regulatory simplification. However, increasing research evidence shows that this approach works for only a small part of the informal economy (DCED, 2017; Olomi and Urassa, 2016) . La Porta and Shleifer (2014, p. 110) found that while the avoidance of taxes and regulations is a significant reason for informality, lowering registration costs neither brings many informal firms into the formal sector nor unleashes economic growth. They also found that informal firms rarely transition to formal ones, lending support to the dual model of informality.
In a study of Latin American firms, La Porta and Shleifer (2008) found that, on average, 91 per cent of registered firms started out as registered. The dual model of informality posits that informal firms reside in an economic space of their own, disconnected from the formal space. According to La Porta and Shleifer (2014) , the supply and demand factors keep informal and formal economies separate. As long as the vast majority of the population lives in poverty, there will be insufficient demand for quality products and services from the formal sector. The formal sector will remain small, catering to a minority of formal workers who can afford higher quality, more expensive goods, while the informal sector will provide low-quality products cheaply to the vast majority of the population who cannot afford the output of the formal sector. This raises the question as to what kind of models can address this challenge.
This study sought to explore and draw lessons from the approaches and modalities used to deal with informality. The main question was what can be learnt from international experience in managing and transforming the informal economy. The specific objectives were as follows:
to critically examine the nature and causes of business informality; to examine the experience, challenges, success stories and lessons from initiatives to manage and transform informality; and to seek fresh insights and bring fresh ideas into the business formalisation debate.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next sections, an in-depth literature review on the nature and causes of informality is presented. Next, using a qualitative case study approach, a comprehensive analysis is conducted to illustrate how the four economies examined in this study have attempted to address informality. Based on the qualitative case analysis, propositions that reflect the findings were formulated. Following the analysis, the paper discusses implications from what was learnt about the four economies in managing and transforming the informal economy. The paper then concludes by presenting the limitations of this study and suggesting future research directions.
Theoretical foundation Nature and causes of business informality
The informal sector is characterised by ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership of enterprises, small scale of operations, labour-intensive technology, skills acquired outside the formal school system and unregulated and competitive markets (Hart, 1973; Rakowski, 1994; Sáinz, 1995) . Commonly used criteria in identifying informal firms are legal personality, registration and licensing, type of workspace and employment arrangements (Maloney, 2004) . A distinction is sometimes drawn between de jure (legal) formalisation and de facto (practice) formalisation (Nelson and De Bruijn, 2005) . The informal economy is highly heterogeneous in terms of type of activity, scale of operation, quality of workspace, educational level of operators, motive, dynamism, degree of legal compliance, etc. (Utouh, 2012; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014) . There are three main theories explaining the existence of business informality: the exclusion model, rational exit model and dual economy model. According to the exclusion model, businesses are rendered informal by legal requirements that are too complex, costly and/or culturally alien. While most regulations were implanted from Western developed economies, developing countries have many small/micro enterprises that cannot meet the cost of compliance (De Soto, 2000) , as well as high degrees of informalisation of political and economic markets whereby people make deals based on informal reciprocal relationships, rather than formal procedures (Ninsin, 1991; Hyden, 2004; Anuwa-Amarh, 2015) . The disconnect between indigenous (the majority of informal businesses) and modern institutions leads to a lack of legitimacy (and thus enforcement) of the former (Hyden, 2004; Haili, 2014) .
It is also argued that corporate and political interests may deliberately seek to sustain exclusion of a large part of the economy from the formal mechanisms for two reasons. First, the informal sector functions as a cost-reducing mechanism for formal capitalist enterprises, which enables them to increase competitiveness through dependence on cheap, noncompliant suppliers and distributors (Castells and Portes, 1989) . Secondly, for politicians, the informal sector may function as a vote bank. Because informal operators do not live by the law, some politicians take advantage of this vulnerability to trade protection for votes (Sarkar, 2006; Shami and Majid, 2014; Chatterjee, 2004) . Thus, according to the exclusion model, these punitive, cumbersome and culturally insensitive formalisation models exclude, or hold back, a magnitude of entrepreneurs (De Soto, 1989 , 2000 . These entrepreneurs are unable to access formal financial resources, such as government grants and bank loans, and lack the legal standing to secure government contracts and enter the formal market. Proponents of the exclusion model argue that formalisation can be greatly enhanced if these cumbersome government regulations and other institutional barriers are removed or reduced.
Conversely, in a series of recent studies using World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data, Williams et al. have questioned the widespread assumption that firms starting as Inclusive approach to regulating the second economy unregistered in the informal economy tend to experience poor performance compared to those that are registered in the formal economy at their inception. They found that formal enterprises that started as unregistered and stayed so for a longer period have significantly higher subsequent annual sales and productivity growth rates compared to those that were registered at inception Kedir, 2017a, 2017b; Williams and Kedir, 2016; Williams et al., 2017) . Williams et al. argued that in weak institutional environments, such as those highly prevalent in developing countries, the advantages of registering at inception are offset by the gains of deferring business registration and the low risks of detection and penalisation. They called for a paradigm shift towards policies that are more positive and aim at improving the benefits gained from business registration and eradicating or minimalising the systemic formal institutional deficiencies that discourage entrepreneurs from registering their ventures from the start. Abdallah (2017) makes similar arguments to Williams et al., he found that in Tanzania, the firms in the informal sector registered higher growth rates than their counterparts.
According to the rational exit theory, a segment of business operators consciously decides to be informal to avoid compliance costs associated with rules, regulations and taxes, as well as the convenience and flexibility offered by operating informally (Nelson and De Bruijn, 2005; Maloney, 2004; Chen, 2012; Rothenberg et al., 2016) . SMEs will evade formalisation when the costs of formality are greater than its benefits (Levy, 2008; Maloney, 2004) . Rothenberg et al. argued that entrepreneurs make the formality decision like any other investment decision, carefully considering the expected return on the investment. Some of the commonly listed benefits that accrue to formalised firms that may elude informal firms are government contracts, access to training and development programs, financial inclusion, ready access to government grants, bank loans, legal standing-avoiding harassment from corrupt officials, etc. These benefits are pitched against the cost of formalisation, such as the cost of registration and, the cost of compliance with various regulations, taxations, etc. Thus, according to proponents of the rational exit model, formalisation can be achieved by increasing the benefits while reducing the cost of formality. Moreover, all and any existing benefits of formalisation must be made salient while enforcing registration requirements (Rothenberg et al., 2016) .
The dual economy model casts the informal sector as a unique segment of the economy, characterised by low levels of skills, poor technology, low productivity and low incomes and, therefore, the inability to comply with the standards of the "modern" economy (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008) . Poor and low-skilled people view the informal sector as the only option for securing their livelihoods (Lewis, 1954; Chowdhurry, 2007) . Contrary to the other two theories, the dual economy model holds that structural reforms, such as reduction in registration costs and the simplification of the legal requirements, are unlikely to enhance the formalisation of the informal sector. The informal sector is viewed as meeting a need that the formal sector cannot provide given its cost structure. Thus, the two sectors are fundamentally different (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014) and as long as there is a strong demand for the informal sector's products, its presence will persist.
Initial views of the dual economy assumed that it was a temporary phenomenon that would disappear as the modern sectors expanded (Lewis, 1954) . According to this school of thought, formalisation can be enhanced through economic development, which would increase the earning potential of those at the bottom of the economic pyramid and, in turn, would increase the demand for formal sector products while decreasing demand for the informal sector's products (Rothenberg et al., 2016) . However, it is now becoming clear that most informal operators are trapped in a vicious cycle by their low resource endowments JEEE and legal and economic structures that are increasingly excluding them. Several countries have already acknowledged the existence of a "second economy" that requires a special policy and regulatory framework (Olomi and Urassa, 2016) .
Methodology

Research approach
The study adopted a descriptive-qualitative method (Lambert and Lambert, 2012) through document review, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and stakeholder validation meetings that were mainly based on the explorative research design. Through the triangulation of data, comparisons and critical reflection, the researchers identified emerging themes and patterns. Following Carneiro et al. (2016) , the researchers used different data collection strategies and different data sources for content validity purposes. The study started without any preconceived ideas or framework, allowing important findings to shape the paper.
In previous research, the case study method was used to provide theoretical and practical insights (Arenas, Sanchez and Murphy, 2013) . In this exploratory research, the goal was to critically examine the nature and causes of business informality, as well as the initiatives that have facilitated or hindered the transformation of business informality. Given the paucity of research in this specific area and, more precisely, in Africa, the case method is appropriate as it facilitates the exploration and analyses of this complex social phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) . The cases presented here were selected on the basis of theoretical sampling, as they were considered appropriate for providing new insights into the nature and causes of business informality in Sub-Saharan Africa, given the region's recent regulatory reforms and attempts at formalisation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995) . Each country included in the sample met the following criteria: located in sub-Saharan Africa; undertook regulatory reforms and/or made documented attempts at formalisation of firms in the informal sector during the past five years; and in each country the study was conducted in the capital city and major cities, where entrepreneurial activities tend to be most intense and where the key government offices are located.
As with every qualitative study, the subjectivity and interpretation inevitably affect the replicability and generalisability of the findings. However, arguably, the rich meanings emerging from the qualitative analysis of the text are critically insightful (Krippendorff, 1980) . Krippendorff opined that in qualitative studies, it is not so much about how objectively a study is executed, but rather how compellingly it is presented that makes a piece of research valuable to the scientific community. There are two main approaches to gathering and analysing case study data. First, there is the nested approach which examines multiple sources within a single organisation (country) (Yin, 2009 ) and then there is the cross-case analysis approach, which may involve four to ten case studies of different organisations (countries) (Eisenhardt, 1989) . In this study, both approaches are adopted. The nested approach is used to analyse interviews scripts gathered within each country, and the cross-country analysis is used to analyse the commonalities among the countries.
Data collection. In the nested approach (Yin, 2009) Analysis A systematic approach advocating for grounded methods research was adopted (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003; Corbin and Strauss, 2014) . First, the driving research questions were JEEE identified, as earlier stated, to guide the data collection and analysis. The target populations and the specific classes of participants within these populations were then selected. Theoretical sampling, where participants were chosen for theoretical, not statistical, reasons was deployed (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995) . Each country was selected based on its record in managing informality and documented attempts at formalisation. Consequently, in each country, the capital city and any major cities were selected given the intensity of the entrepreneurial activities and the location of key government offices in these cities. Secondly, an interview protocol was generated. The protocol was structured to explore the dimensions involved in transitioning informal enterprises, particularly among those in less industrialised nations (see the sample of interview protocol [semi-structured questions]). The interview protocol called for developing an instrument that would assist us in conducting an in-depth investigation of the process and nature of the factors that have eased or deterred the transformation of business informality.
Thirdly, semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews were conducted with local governments, central government ministries and agencies relevant to formalisation issues, informal sector operators and their associations. Structured questions were used on all interviewees, and each person was asked the same questions. However, whenever a respondent's point was not clear or when a respondent shared a fascinating point, unstructured questions were used to seek clarification or deeper insights. The validation events (Appendix 2) were used throughout the iterative data collection as advocated for in grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006) . Grounded theory requires constant comparison between data collection, data coding and theory development until enough information to fully develop (or saturate) the model is generated.
Fourthly, data from each country were coded using the nested approach (multiple interviews from multiple stakeholders within each country). Archival data were also used to triangulate the data. In the event of any inconsistencies, clarification was sought from the concerned stakeholder. The data from World Bank Doing Business were used to generate cross-country comparative charts and tables, while an in-depth content analysis was conducted on the World Bank Doing Business reports from 2015-2017 using NVivo 11.0. Two authors independently coded the data, and discrepancies were resolved through discussion and the re-examination of the data. After using the nested approach, crosscountry analysis was used to identify the commonalities among the four countries.
Lastly, feedback from experts in the field was sought. Initially, colleagues were consulted and later, an early draft of the article was presented at a formalisation Stakeholder Validation Meeting in Dar es Salaam, a national conference of local authorities in Tanzania and also at an international conference (Appendix 2). The analyses were further refined based on feedback (Bruton, Khavul and Chavez, 2011) .
Findings
Direct vs indirect formalisation
The study has identified two major approaches in realising the objectives of formalisation. The conventional approach to formalisation has been a direct one, whereby the government, its agency or a local government deals directly with the businesses to provide formalisation related interventions, such as registration, licensing, training, information, allocating, constructing and managing workspace. The research team observed an emerging, indirect approach to formalisation, whereby the state, its agency or the local government empowers and partners with business associations to improve traceability, control and access to capacity building, access to premises and markets, voice, etc. In indirect formalisation, control over the informal business activities is partly through self-regulation mechanisms Inclusive approach to regulating the second economy within the associations or cooperatives. Below, the study examines and compares the experiences and lessons from these two approaches.
Direct formalisation approaches and initiatives
In this section, the paper will discuss findings from the various direct measures that the four countries have used to encourage formalisation. The findings were first derived from the field study and then validated through content analysis of the World Bank reports and analysis of World Bank data.
Simplification of regulations. The field study indicated that all the countries included in this study have implemented several programs intended to simplify business regulations. The reforms have included automation of name search and online registration (Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda), mobile phone registration (Kenya) and online and single payment of registration fees (Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda). In 2005, Ghana introduced a reform program, which was primarily aimed at reducing the time and cost of registering businesses as well as decentralising registration to make it more accessible. In 2009, Ghana engaged in yet another regulatory reform by integrating the various tax agencies (Customs, Internal Revenue and value added tax -VAT) to enhance information flow and reduce compliance costs in hopes of promoting voluntary compliance (Table I) .
A cross-country analysis of the World Bank Doing Business data ranks Rwanda first among this group of countries in terms of ease of doing business indicators, followed by Kenya and Ghana. Tanzania is ranked just above the regional average (Table II) . Rwanda was ranked number two in sub-Saharan Africa in 2014, 2016 and 2017 and third in 2015. At the global level, it was ranked 62 and 56 in , respectively (World Bank, 2017 . In terms of ease of doing business, Rwanda takes the lead on all but two featured categories. Rwanda leads in access to credit, property registration, ease of tax payment and ease of starting a business, while Tanzania takes the lead in readiness in attaining electricity and Ghana leads in construction permits (Figure 1) . A similar trend is observed in 2016-2017 World Bank data (Table II) .
However, it is also important to note that Rwanda has the lowest gross national income (GNI) per capita, and the lowest national population. Therefore, Rwanda is growing from a smaller base. Nevertheless, Rwanda has made remarkable growth in the aforementioned categories. For instance, Rwanda is ranked second in the world in terms of ease of accessing credit, while the region's average rank is 116.98 out of 190. Tanzania made the most remarkable improvement from being ranked 152 out of 190 (Distance to Frontier [DTF] [3] of 25 out of 100) in 2016 to a rank of 44 (DTF score of 65) in 2017 in the ease of accessing of electricity category. Kenya was among the ten economies recognised for making the biggest improvements in business regulations in the last two consecutive years (World Bank, 2017) . Table III summarises the most salient regulatory reforms accomplished by the four countries that are pertinent to this study. According to Doing Business 2005 to 2017 World Bank data, Rwanda implemented a total of 47 reforms across all indicators. However, in this study, the content analysis table has highlighted only three reforms that are most relevant.
The cross-country analysis as depicted in Figure 1 demonstrates that all four countries have made attempts to simplify regulations and improve the ease of doing business. This is evident by the fact that they all rank above the region's average, except for Tanzania, in the ease of tax payment category and the ease of obtaining construction permits in Kenya and Rwanda. It is also imperative to note that the decline in some indicators was necessitated by the demand for higher standards or more stringent quality controls. For instance, Rwanda reinforced quality control by establishing required qualifications for architects and engineers. This reform increased both cost and time requirements and thus decreased access. However, this reform increased the overall integrity of the sector. In general, all four JEEE countries made progress in several dimensions, as evident from both the field study and the World Bank data.
Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that even though Rwanda has been so successful in reforming its business regulations, over 90 per cent of its enterprises are informal (Sparks and Barnett, 2010) . Additionally, none of the other three countries have reduced informality. Studies in Asia and South America consistently show that regulatory simplification has very limited effect on formalisation (DCED, 2017; Rothenberg et al., 2016; Olomi and Urassa, 2016) . Adams, de Silva and Razmara (2013) found that in sub-Saharan Africa, nearly 70 per cent of employment outside farming is in the informal sector. They further assert that this phenomenon seems to be a significant and durable feature of Africa's economic landscape. Other studies have placed employment in the non-farming informal sector of Kenya as high as 77 per cent (Foeken and Owuor, 2008; Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012; International Labour Organisation, 2013) . Thus, this study proposes that: 
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Access to credit: Collateral registry reform project from 2008 to 2014 enabled the design and implementation of the first modern collateral registry in Africa, opening the market for secured transactions and collateral registry reforms in the region. Between its establishment in 2010 and the end of 2015, the registry facilitated$1.3bn in financing for small-scale businesses and $12bn in total financing for the business sector overall using only movable assets as collateral for loans Kenya Ease of starting a business: Removed the stamp duty fees required for the nominal capital, memorandum and articles of association Property registration: Increased the transparency at its land registry and cadastre Access to electricity: Introduced the use of a geographic information system which eliminated the need to conduct a site visit Rwanda Ease of starting a business: Improved the online registration making it a one-stop shop and streamlining post-registration procedures Construction permits: Strengthened quality control by establishing required qualifications for architects and engineers Property registration: Introduced effective time limits and increased the transparency of the land administration system Tanzania Access to credit: Expanded credit bureau borrower coverage and began to distribute credit data from retailers and utility companies. Enacted reforms guaranteeing borrowers' rights to access and inspect their data Note: Content analysis of World Bank (2017) Inclusive approach to regulating the second economy storey complex for machingas (street traders). However, the building remains largely unoccupied due to its unattractive location, the trading space being enclosed and too big and expensive for the street traders who need (and can afford) much less space and whose business models rely on open (unenclosed) spaces and street traders resisting the rental fee set by the municipal council.
In Kenya, Nairobi County completed the Muthurwa market, which was designed to accommodate 8,000 street traders in 2008. Street traders resisted the rental fees initially set and moved in only after the fees were halved. The market now accommodates 16,000 traders, twice the intended number, and is already being wrecked by overcrowding and inadequate maintenance.
Mwanza (Tanzania) and Accra (Ghana) tried to woo private investors to set up similar complexes through public-private partnerships, but the investors turned down the offers after realising that they would not be able to charge economic rates due to the solidarity of street traders and the politicisation of the rentals. Government-owned premises in each of the countries examined tended to charge lower than market prices, leading to capture and rent seeking by public sector workers and initial occupiers. Thus, the study proposes that:
P2a. Informal businesses are unlikely to transition to the formal sector when an inapt workspace is provided.
P2b. The direct management of a workspace for informal operators by government or governmental agencies is likely to be ineffectual.
Capacity building. All local governments have some form of capacity-building activities (training, credit programs, support of the formation and strengthening of groups of informal operators, etc.) for micro enterprises. Interviews in all four countries revealed that capacitybuilding and credit programs designed for micro enterprises have been ad hoc and are not sustainable and have little visible impact.
In Ghana, capacity building is mainly provided by community development officers or field officers at both the assembly and sub-assembly levels. However, the training is rudimentary at best and the trainers ill-equipped. The training is focused mostly on very basic needs and targets the very poor. The training agenda seems not to be geared towards empowering informal sector operators to formalise and grow, but rather to eke out a living. Kenya has no specific government-sponsored capacity programs directed at informal traders and street vendors. In Tanzania, the community development department deals with the capacity building of women's economic groups, while the youth development department deals with youth groups. However, there is no coherent coordination or promotion of informal sector operators.
Thus, this paper proposes that:
P3a. Informal businesses are unlikely to transition to the formal sector when inapt capacity building is provided.
P3b. Direct capacity building of individual informal operators is likely to be ineffectual if it is not market-orientated and learner-focused.
Enforcement of regulations. Enforcement of regulations is implemented mainly by local governments, which maintain special security personnel for this purpose. However, given the large number of operators, local authorities also contract private firms to collect levies and fine operators who infringe the bylaws. In all cities except Kigali (Rwanda), this has led JEEE to persistent clashes between law enforcement agents and operators. The enforcement agents are often accused of corruption, destruction and illegal confiscation of the operators' tools and products. This harassment is one of the biggest complaints of informal operators. Analysis of the World Bank Doing Business data and content analysis of the Doing Business 2017 Report partially explain Rwanda's success in the enforcement of regulation. Rwanda's rank improved from 127 out of 190 in 2016 to 95 in 2017 (Table IV) . In January 2016, the country introduced the Integrated Electronic Case Management System in Kigali city courts and all commercial courts (Table V) . This reform resulted in a considerable reduction in cost and time and greatly enhanced transparency and the reliability of statistical data on court operations. This may encourage operators to pursue justice due to the affordability and reliability of the court system. Figure 2 places all four nations above the regions' average in the "enforcing contract" category. Kenya's DTF score in the "resolving insolvency" category improved by 12.75 per cent from 2016 to 2017. This improvement coincided with Kenya adopting a new Insolvency Act in 2016 (Table V ). An overall examination of the enforcement of regulations using field study data and archival data demonstrates that these countries are still relatively weak in enforcement of regulations. Tanzania leads with a DTF score of 61.66 per cent, while the region as a whole averages at 47.73 per cent. Rwanda only scored a 56.76 per cent even after the reforms (Table IV) .
Thus, the paper proposes that:
P4a. Informal businesses are unlikely to transition to the formal sector when inapt enforcement of regulations is imposed.
P4b. Direct enforcement of regulations pertaining to informal operators by the government is likely to be ineffectual when the regulations or the implementers are ill-equipped.
Indirect business formalisation
There seems to be a paradigm shift towards the indirect formalisation of informal businesses. Some of the indirect formalisation approaches in the four countries studied are shown in Table I . Rwanda is consciously encouraging, and even forcing, every business operator who cannot get a conventional license to join a cooperative (at least ten people are needed to form a cooperative), with a database of members and a certain minimum level of self-regulation and services to members. Associations are encouraged to develop workspace for their members. The local governments engage closely with the cooperatives, supporting capacity building, access to finance, access to land and, in some cases, guaranteeing loans for the construction of workspace owned by the cooperative. The cooperatives organise training for members, whether the training is offered by government agencies, development partners or by the cooperative itself.
Though not as developed as in Rwanda, the other three countries studied have active associations that are working with the local and central governments, as well as development partners, to enhance organisation, traceability, capacity and access to important services to members. Table I summarises what is being done by at least some associations in each of the countries.
VIBINDO Society, the biggest association of micro enterprises and informal workers in Tanzania, provides ID cards, policy advocacy, medical insurance and credit to members. Market (including weekly markets -magulio) traders have basic forms of internal regulations (payment of fees, cleaning and code of conduct at the market) and which provide security in markets. Motor vehicle drivers have also agreed on a schedule of operations, fare, and a code of conduct, which are all strictly enforced. 
JEEE
The key feature of the policy and regulatory framework for micro enterprise in Kenya is that operators register with associations rather than the government. The Micro and Small Enterprises Agency (MSEA) envisions improved formalisation, beginning with enterprises being traceable through an association (35 members are needed to register one), formally recognised premises and finally, the formal registration these businesses, with built-in incentives to move to the next level. A Registrar of Micro and Small Enterprises Associations was established under the auspice of the Micro and Small Enterprises Act. Thus, the study proposes that:
P5. Informal businesses are likely to realise the benefits of formalisation (traceability, access to information, training, workspace, finance, insurance, etc.) when encouraged or required to join self-regulated cooperatives or associations. Discussion This paper explored the nature and causes of business informality, while seeking to gain fresh insights from the experiences, challenges, success stories and lessons learnt from initiatives implemented by four sub-Saharan African nations in the process of managing and transforming informality. Regulatory reforms and initiatives designed to promote business formation and, ultimately, formalisation were analysed. A set of propositions were formulated that may serve as a guide for future research. This study has identified and documented a potentially powerful, indirect formalisation approach, under which registered cooperatives or associations register, regulate and provide critical services to informal operators. In the same way that group lending made micro credit possible, indirect formalisation promises to make regulating and servicing micro enterprises viable. However, the approach seems to have received almost no academic interest. The implication of these findings is that, for research and policy on business formalisation to be effective, the field needs to more critically examine the nature of informality in specific contexts. Also, it is critical to partition the informal economy into specific segments that lend themselves better to theory development and policymaking.
Developing countries should explore indirect formalisation as a more practical and inclusive approach to legally recognising their micro enterprises. Provision of workspace and construction of business premises for food vendors, street traders and other informal operators should be given high priority in all urban areas. The model for building structures for micro enterprises should change in favour of ownership by the operators through their own associations or other private sector investors.
The findings of the study have shed some light on emerging potentials and models for business formalisation. However, there is a lot that needs to be better understood to design appropriate formalisation policy. Foremost is to learn more about the different segments of the informal economy and how they are likely to respond to different policy measures. Secondly, it is important to find out how the special policy and regulatory frameworks are faring in the countries where they have been tried. There are many reasons why they may not work well, including resistance by politicians and policymakers and the risk of trapping otherwise growing micro enterprises in the second economy. It is also likely that indirect formalisation will work better in certain sub-sectors than others. Asongu and Tchamyou (2016) , based on a sample of 53 African countries, found that there may be unexpected signs when the government policy is not effective. Such laxity in the formulation or implementation of policies tends to undermine business prospects in a wide spectrum of fields. Thirdly, attention should be directed towards understanding how the structure of a sector and the economy affects economic marginalisation and dualism, with a focus on identifying policy options that can result in a healthy co-existence of the two economies and maximising the potential and propensity of the second economy actors to graduate to the first economy.
Conclusion and future research direction
This study started with a broad agenda, allowing insights to shape its direction. Future research can have a closer focus on the emerging perspectives and specific sectors. The merits of indirect formalisation can be examined and the model enhanced through quantitative research.
Government attempts to directly build capacity by providing finance or workspace to regulate micro enterprises are apparently not effective. There is an apparent paradigm shift towards indirect formalisation, under which business associations or JEEE cooperatives are empowered to take greater responsibility for registration, selfregulation, capacity building, finance and provision and management of premises. Robust associations can create mutually re-enforcing dynamics among the key pillars of business formalisation. Such robust associations can police members, influence policymakers, provide or influence availability of premises and markets and contribute to capacity building, which, in turn, attracts members and strengthens the associations (Figure 3 ). This argument is consistent with Jardon and Tañski's (2018) findings. Jardon and Tañski found that space and place constraints small business success in resource scarce environments and accelerate growth in supportive environment with ready access to resources, complementary skills and knowledge, reinforcing the idea of agglomeration.
Working through organisations owned by the informal operators may enhance the legitimacy of the regulatory mechanisms. This may be a way of countering the disconnection between transplanted institutions with local economic actors, and according legitimacy to the formal institutions.
The use of indirect formalisation through empowering associations and cooperatives to deliver these formalisation services to their members is apparently far more effective and efficient compared to the use of formal government institutions. The cost structure of government institutions, as well as their capacities, does not match the task of engaging with a large number of very small and unstable businesses. Melese (2018) opined that government support often breed overdependency among the micro enterprises. Melese further argued that it is imperative for private sector to get involved in the eco-system by facilitating services such as savings and credit, business development and skills training. Additionally, the use of associations resolves challenges related to under-pricing and rentseeking in workspaces managed by the government. Direct formalisation will work for only a small part of the economy and leaves out the base of the pyramid. Indirect formalisation has greater potential of being inclusive and reaching the population at the base of the pyramid. 
